Decision making biases in the communication of earthquake risk

Abstract:

L’Aquila, with 6 scientists convicted of manslaughter, shocked the scientific community, leading to urgent re-appraisal of communication methods for low-probability, high-impact events. Before the trial, a commission investigating the earthquake recommended risk assessment be formalised via operational earthquake forecasts and that social scientists be enlisted to assist in developing communication strategies. Psychological research has identified numerous decision biases relevant to this, including hindsight bias, where people (after the fact) overestimate an event’s predictability. This affects experts as well as naïve participants as it relates to their ability to construct a plausible causal story rather than the likelihood of the event. Another problem is availability, which causes overestimation of the likelihood of observed rare events due to their greater noteworthiness. This, however, is complicated by the ‘description-experience’ gap, whereby people underestimate probabilities for events they have not experienced. That is, people who have experienced strong earthquakes judge them more likely while those who have not judge them less likely – relative to actual probabilities. Finally, format changes alter people’s decisions. That is people treat '1 in 10,000' as different from 0.01% despite their mathematical equivalence. Such effects fall under the broad term framing, which describes how different framings of the same event alter decisions. In particular, people’s attitude to risk depends significantly on how scenarios are described. We examine the effect of biases on the communication of change in risk. South Australian participants gave responses to scenarios describing familiar (bushfire) or unfamiliar (earthquake) risks. While bushfires are rare in specific locations, significant fire events occur each year and are extensively covered. By comparison, our study location (Adelaide) last had a M5 quake in 1954. Preliminary results suggest the description-experience gap is central to problems in risk communication, implying that accurate communication of risks can not be achieved via better description alone as this will be outweighed by people’s extended, quake–free experience. Communication methods designed to account for this bias are discussed.