Modeling regulated water utility investment incentives

Abstract:

This work attempts to model the infrastructure investment choices of privatized water utilities subject to rate of return and price cap regulation. The goal is to understand how regulation influences water companies’ investment decisions such as their desire to engage in transfers with neighbouring companies. We formulate a profit maximization capacity expansion model that finds the schedule of new supply, demand management and transfer schemes that maintain the annual supply-demand balance and maximize a companies’ profit under the 2010-15 price control process in England. Regulatory incentives for costs savings are also represented in the model. These include: the CIS scheme for the capital expenditure (capex) and incentive allowance schemes for the operating expenditure (opex) . The profit-maximizing investment program (what to build, when and what size) is compared with the least cost program (social optimum). We apply this formulation to several water companies in South East England to model performance and sensitivity to water network particulars.

Results show that if companies’ are able to outperform the regulatory assumption on the cost of capital, a capital bias can be generated, due to the fact that the capital expenditure, contrarily to opex, can be remunerated through the companies’ regulatory capital value (RCV). The occurrence of the ‘capital bias’ or its entity depends on the extent to which a company can finance its investments at a rate below the allowed cost of capital. The bias can be reduced by the regulatory penalties for underperformances on the capital expenditure (CIS scheme); Sensitivity analysis can be applied by varying the CIS penalty to see how and to which extent this impacts the capital bias effect. We show how regulatory changes could potentially be devised to partially remove the ‘capital bias’ effect. Solutions potentially include allowing for incentives on total expenditure rather than separately for capex and opex and allowing both opex and capex to be remunerated through a return on the company’s regulatory capital value.