Science, Congress and Institutional Arrangements: The Election Classes of 1974 and 1994 Influencing Resource Policy

Abstract:

Members of the United States House of Representatives first elected in the same year have a demographic influence in Congress for more than twenty years, particularly at the committee leadership level. Policy outcomes in a wide range of contemporary science and technology topics can be understood comparing the large class of Democrats elected in 1974 (20.9 percent of seats) to the large class of Republicans in the 1994 elections (19.8 percent of seats).

The 1974 class was able to extend a policy consensus for twenty years beyond their initial election. With majorities of 56-67 percent over two decades, the class of 1974 helped reform Congress by devolving power in the chamber and producing legislation limiting the power of the executive and campaign finance contributions, further reinforcing their influence in policy making. The 1994 class has as yet been unable to sustain unified government beyond three consecutive Congresses while the magnitude of their majority in divided government has remained slim (51-56 percent). Changes to congressional rules have not been maintained due to oscillating majorities, and little legislative innovation has occurred. Instead, the class of 1994 has depended on blocking tactics and high stakes budgetary brinkmanship to further their policy goals of shrinking government.

The policy consensus of scientific management (1876 to 1980, possibly extending through 2000) has been challenged by the class of 1994 which desires a smaller federal government. During the struggle between these co-existing congressional factions, science and technology research and development decisions have been moved into high visibility and high conflict arenas common with valence issues and election rhetoric rather than the low visibility low conflict arena of bureaucratic decision-making where resource policy had been data driven and incremental.

Change in political approach to public problems does not happen in a single election. Control of institutional arrangements is much more complex when considering the entire range of strategies available in the constitutionally defined systems of federalism and separated powers. Political strategists no longer see science as beneficial in the tactical moves for control of domestic policy, and therefore no longer protect resource policy from partisan attack.